

Message Text

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ACTION IO-11

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AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

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AMCONSUL MUNICH

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

USMISSION USUN

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 3091

E.OM 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UN, UR

SUBJECT: MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS: USSR

REF: STATE 37591.

1. SUMMARY. THIS EMBASSY STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE

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CONCEPT OF MORE FREQUENT EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIET

GOVERNMENT ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES AND HAS PURSUED THEM TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE DURING THE PAST YEAR. WE HAVE FOUND THE SOVIETS CONSISTENTLY INTERESTED IN SUCH EXCHANGES AND RELATIVELY FRANK, EVEN ON ISSUES WHERE THEIR VIEWS AND OURS DIFFER. IF THE SOVIETS ARE TO BE MOVED OVER TIME TO TAKE THEIR PLACE IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY AS A RESPONSIBLE GREAT POWER, MULTILATERAL ISSUES PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES FOR MANY SMALL STEPS; SOME HAVE ALREADY BEEN TAKEN; AND WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE OTHERS WHERE WE CAN. AT THE SAME TIME, OF COURSE, THE USSR REMAINS OUR MAIN ADVERSARY ON THE WORLD STAGE; ITS INTERESTS AND POLICIES, PARTICULARLY ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS, ARE DIRECTLY OPPOSITE TO OURS MOST OF THE TIME. WE HAVE LIMITED LEVERAGE, BUT WE SHOULD USE ALL WE HAVE.

2. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE BELIEVE THAT OUR MOST PRODUCTIVE APPROACH WOULD BE TO CONCENTRATE INITIALLY ON AREAS WHERE THERE IS SOME CONVERGENCE OF INTERESTS (DISARMAMENT, LAW OF THE SEA, SOME ECONOMIC MATTERS). IN THIS AREA WE BELIEVE THAT A GOOD BEGINNING HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE. SECONDLY, WE SHOULD PRESENT OUR VIEWS ON ISSUES OF HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO US AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE AND EMPHASIZE WHY WE HOLD SUCH VIEWS. WE SHOULD ASSUME A STRONG ADVOCACY ROLE ON ISSUES WHICH CONCERN US DIRECTLY (PUERTO RICO, PANAMA, GUAM), AND SHOULD PRESENT U.S. VIEWS ON OTHER ISSUES WHERE DIVERGENCE IS LIKELY (VIETNAM, KOREA, "ZIONISM", AFRICA) ON A SELECTIVE BASIS. THIRDLY, WE SHOULD SEEK SOVIET VIEWS ON MATTERS OF HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO THEM. IN PARTICULAR WE SHOULD ASK FOR INDICATION OF NEW SOVIET UN INITIATIVES WELL BEFORE THEY ARE PUBLICLY INTRODUCED. FOURTHLY, WE SHOULD MAXIMIZE OUR CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES, RECOGNIZING THE UNIQUE STATUS OF MISSIONS AND DELEGATIONS ON THE SPOT, ESPECIALLY IN NEW YORK, BUT EXPANDING THE SUPPLEMENTARY ROLE OF EXCHANGES IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE BECOME MORE ACTIVE, MORE COMPETENT AND GENERALLY MORE RESPONSIBLE IN MULTILATERAL FORA IN RECENT YEARS, AND THIS TREND IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE. THEY HAVE BEEN BUILDING A CORPS OF PROFESSIONALS IN MOSCOW AND ABROAD WHERE DIALOGUE IS POSSIBLE, AND WHO HAVE PROVED

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THEMSELVES CAPABLE OF INFLUENCING DECISIONS ON AN EXPANDING RANGE OF QUESTIONS, ESPECIALLY WHERE THE DIALOGUE BEGINS WELL BEFORE DECISIONS MUST BE TAKEN. TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS TREND AND TO KEEP OUR VIEWS IN FRONT OF SOVIET POLICY MAKERS, WE NEED TO TALK WITH THE SOVIETS MORE OFTEN AND MORE THOROUGHLY. FOR THIS REASON, WE FEEL IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THIS EMBASSY HAVE AN OFFICER DEVOTING HIS FULL TIME AND ENERGY TO MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS,

AND HAVE REQUESTED SUCH A POSITION FROM THE DEPARTMENT. END SUMMARY.

3. SOME OF THE QUESTIONS IN REFTEL PARA 7 ARE NOT EASILY REDUCED TO SHORT ANSWERS FOR THE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE OF ITS UNIQUE STATUS IN WORLD AFFAIRS. BUT FOR PURPOSES OF TABULATING RESPONSES, WE OFFER THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS, DOLLOVED BY A MORE GENERAL DISCUSSION OF U.S.- SOVIET RELATIONS ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES:

--(A) THE SOVIET UNION'S PRIMARY MULTILATERAL INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN 1976 WILL BE TO EMPHASIZE THOSE POLICIES ---DETENTE, DISARMAMENT, THE SOVIET "PEACE POLICY"--WHICH PORTRAY MOSCOW AS LEADING THE EFFORT TO REDUCE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS WHILE IDENTIFYING ITS OPPONENTS AS ENEMIES OF DETENTE AND PEACE. WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK THE SOVIETS WILL SEEK ADEQUATE WORKING RELATIONS WITH WESTERN GOVERNMENTS, ESPECIALLY THE U.S., AS EVIDENCE THAT THEIR POLICIES ARE WORKING. CONVERSELY THEY WILL SEEK TO ISOLATE THEIR OPPONENTS, ESPECIALLY THE CHINESE, AS ENEMIES OF DETENTE AND PEACE. ON THIRD-WORLD ISSUES THE SOVIETS FIND IT CONVENIENT TO SIDE WITH THE AUTOMATIC MAJORITIES ON NEARLY ALL ISSUES. BUT THEY STILL PREFER NOT TO GET PULLED INTO CONCRETE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC QUESTIONS, LARGELY BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT PARTICIPANTS IN MAJOR WORLD FINANCIAL OR ECONOMIC BODIES AND IS NOT EXERT A SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE OVER THE DELIBERATIONS OF THOSE BODIES. SINCE THEY ARE SO PERFXPHERAL TO MOST THIRD-WORLD ECONOMIC CONCERNS, THEIR GESTURES OF SUPPORT COST THEM LITTLE AND ARE POLITICALLY USEFUL. THEY WILL ATTEMPT TO SHOW THAT THEY ARE THE "TRUE FRIENDS" OF THE ASIANS, AFRICANS AND LATIN AMERICANS WHILE CLAIMING THAT CHINA POSITS FALSE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE TWO "SUPERPOWERS" AND OTHER COUNTRIES.
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--(B) THE SOVIETS TAKE ACCOUNT FIRST OF THEIR OWN INTERESTS, THEN THOSE OF THEIR ALLIES AND FRIENDS, THEN THOSE OF THE THIRD-WORLD WHERE THEY ARE COMPATIBLE, AND FINALLY OF ADVERSARIES. THEY TRY TO LEAD DIRECTLY OR BY

PROXY ON MOST ISSUES, AND THEY WILLINGLY GO ALONG WITH THE MORE RADICAL PROPOSALS VOICED BY THIRD-WORLD GROUPS.

--(C) THEIR DELEGATIONS ARE APPARENTLY INSTRUCTED FULLY, BUT SOMETIMES DELEGATIONS INCLUDE THOSE WHO WRITE THE INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH ALLOWS FOR SOME LATITUDE ON THE SPOT. REPORTING IS GENERALLY THOROUGH BUT NOT ALWAYS RAPID.

--(C) SOME SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES, NOTABLY AMBASSADOR MALIK IN NEW YORK, HAVE ENOUGH CLOUT AT HIGH LEVELS TO GIVE THEM IMPORTANCE OF LIMITED INDEPENDENCE. FOR THIS REASON AMONG OTHERS, SOVIET EXPERTS IN MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS HAVE REPEATEDLY HINTED TO US THAT THEY WOULD DESIRE MORE CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW AS A MEANS OF CIRCUMVENTING MALIK.

--(3) SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE CONSISTENTLY WELCOMED EXCHANGES WITH U.S. OFFICIALS ON MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS, AND THEY OCCASIONALLY SOLICIT OUR SUPPORT OR ACQUIESCENCE ON MATTERS THEY CONSIDER IMPORTANT. AS DISCUSSED BELOW, HOWEVER, THERE ARE LIMITS TO THE DEGREE OF INFLUENCE WE CAN HOPE TO EXERT.

4. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT WHILE OUR EFFORTS WITH THE SOVIETS CAN ONLY BE IMPROVED AT THE MARGIN NOW, IMPORTANT CHANGE OVER THE LONG TERM IS POSSIBLE AS IT GRADUALLY SHEDS ITS AUTARCHIC CONTINENTAL COCOON, THE SOVIET UNION WILL NECESSARILY FACE GROWING DILEMMAS RESULTING FROM WORLDWIDE RESPONSIBILITIES AND INTERESTS. IT WILL NOT BECOME A BUTTERFLY OVERNIGHT, IF EVER, BUT WE FEEL IT IS IMPORTANT TO ENCOURAGE IT TO BECOME A CONSTRUCTIVE FORCE WHERE WE CAN. TOGETHER WITH ARMS CONTROL, "MULTILATERAL ISSUES" PROVIDE A GOOD LITMUS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS, AND PERHAPS THE BEST VEHICLE NOW AVAILABLE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE FOR ENCOURAGING RESPONSIBLE

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SOVIET BEHAVIOR. UNLIKE ARMS CONTROL, MANY OF THESE ISSUES ARE RELATIVELY UNFAMILIAR TO THE SOVIETS AND RELATIVELY PERIPHERAL TO THE DRIVING TRADITIONAL PRE-OCCUPATIONS WHICH DETERMINE THE USSR'S LINE. LIKE ARMS CONTROL, HOWEVER, THEY ARE IMPORTANT TO THE SOVIETS, AND ARE PART OF THE PRESENT REGIME'S EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE RESPECTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY ON THE WORLD STAGE. ARMS CONTROL IS VERY IMPORTANT TO THE SOVIETS AND MULTILATERAL ISSUES OFTEN ARE NOT, BUT IN TERMS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY --THE CAPACITY TO CHANGE--THE EFFECT IS MUCH THE SAME.

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AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

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AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

USMISSION USUN

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

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5. IN RECENT YEARS, THEREFORE, THE SOVIET UNION HAS BECOME SIGNIFICANTLY MORE INVOLVED IN THE WHOLE RANGE OF MULTI-LATERAL ACTIVITIES, AND ITS INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS REFLECTS INCREASED COMPETENCE AND EXPERTISE. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IN PARTICULAR HAS DEVELOPED A CORPS OF SKILLED DIPLOMATS AND INTERNATAIONAL LEGAL SPECIALISTS WHO WORK AT LEAST AS WELL IN GENEVA, LONDON OR NEW YORK AS THEIR COLLEAGUE
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IN OTHER DIPLOMATIC SERVICES. THESE MEN, MANY OF THEM STILL YOUNG, ARE CONSIDERABLY MORE FLEXIBLE AND RESPONSIVE THAN THEIR PREDECESSORS OF TEN YEARS AGO, AND THEY HAVE

DEMONSTRATED A CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE DECISIONS ON AN EXPANDING RANGE OF TOPICS. THEY ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO WELL-REASONED ARGUMENT, ESPECIALLY EARLY ON IN THE CUMBERSOME SOVIET DECISION-MAKING PROCESS.

6. IN OUR VIEW, CONCEQUENTLY, WE SHOULD DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS ON TWL LEVELS, REFLECTING BOTH THE INEVITABLE DIVERGENCE OF OUR APPROACHES ON MOST OF THE BROADER POLITICAL ISSUES AND THE POSSIBILITY OF REACHING ACCOMMODATIONS IN SPECIFIC AREAS. ON SPECIFIC ISSUED WHERE WE HAVE CONVERGENT OR PARALLEL INTERESTS, WE SHOULD SEEK UNDERSTANDING AND EVEN COOPERATION. AMONG THE AREAS WHICH SPRING TO MIND ARE LAW OF THE SEA, SEVERAL ARMS CONTROL MATTERS INCLUDING CCD COORDINATION, OUTER SPACE QUESTIONS, AND UN CHARTER REVIEW AND BUDGET QUESTIONS. THE SOVIETS CAN ALSO BE PRESSED TO TAKE A MORE RESPONSIBLE ROLE IN CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES SUCH AS GRAIN RESERVES AND MULTILATERAL AID EFFORTS. THESE ARE ALL AREAS WHERE U.S. AND SOVIET INTERESTS NEED NOT BE ANTAGONISTIC EVEN WHEN THEY DIVERGE. IN OUR VIEW, THE MAJOR EFFORT SHOULD BE FOCUSED ON THESE AREAS, TO MINIMIZE DIFFERENCES AND WORK OUT ACCORDS WHERE POSSIBLE. IN PARTICULAR, WE SHOULD TRY TO PREVENT NON-SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES OVER PROCEDURES OR PERSONALITIES FROM INTERFERING WITH THE SEARCH FOR OUR PREFERRED SOLUTIONS.

7. ON THE BRAODER SCALE OF GLOBAL POLITICS, WE AND THE SOVIETS REMAIN FAR APART ON NUMEROUS ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL FORA, AND THEIR PERFORMANCES AT BOTH THE SEVENTH SPECIAL SESSION AND THE 30TH UNGA WERE UNFORTUNATELY TYPICAL. THEY DO NOT MERELY MARCH TO A DIFFERENT DRUMMER, THEY ARE LEADING A DIFFERENT BAND, PLAYING A DIFFERENT SONG, AND IN THE PROCESS TRYING TO DROWN OURS OUT. IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE TERM, THIS MEANS AGREEING WITH AND ENCOURAGING THE NON-ALIGNED IN THEIR ATTACKS ON THE DEVELOPED WORLD IN GENERAL AND THE U.S. IN PARTICULAR. THE SOVIETS OFTEN SUPPORT AND, IN SOME CASES, LOBBY INTENSIVELY FOR RESOLUTIONS WHICH ARE DIRECTLY OPPOSED TO U.S. INTERESTS. THEIR PERFORMANCE ON KOREA, "ZIONISM",
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VIETNAMESE REPRESENTATION, PUERTO RICO, GUAM, AFRICA AND "ANTI-COLONIAL" ISSUED AT THE 30TH UNGA FURNISHES EXAMPLES. THE SOVIETS ARE BECOMING AWARE THAT IN AN ERA OF DETENTE, THERE ARE COSTS INVOLVED FOR THEM IN SUCH POSTURES, BUT OUR LEVERAGE WILL REMAIN LIMITED. NEVERTHELESS, WE SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO PRESENT OUR VIEWS FORCEFULLY, TAKING A POSITION OF STRONG ADVOCACY WHERE WE ARE DIRECTLY CONCERNED AND WHERE OUR POSITION IS STRONGEST, AS WITH PUERTO RICO, PANAMA AND GUAM. WHEN RAISED EARLY AND FORCEFULLY, PARTICULARLY AT THE HIGHEST

LEVELS, WE THINK THAT WE CAN INFLUENCE SOVIET BEHAVIOR AND STYLE ON SUCH ISSUES. HOWEVER, WE WOULD CAUTION THAT GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR WORLDWIDE USAGE IS SELDOM APPROPRIATE FOR MOSCOW. TO BE EFFECTIVE OUR PRESENTATIONS SHOULD BE TAILORED TO FIT OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. FOR EXAMPLE, OUR CASE ON PUERTO RICO DURING THE 30TH UNGA WOULD PROBABLY HAVE CARRIED MORE WEIGHT IF IT HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE REALITIES OF THE KNOWN SOVIET POSITION AND OF THE OVERALL US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.

8. WE SHOULD ALSO SEEK TO ELICIT TEEG#INFORMATION ON THE AREAS WHERE MOSCOW WILL CONCENTRATE ITS OWN EFFORTS IN MULTILATERAL MEETINGS. IN PARTICULAR WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO ASK, HERE AND ELSEWHERE, FOR FOREWARNING OF NEW INITIATIVES WELL BEFORE THEY ARE PRESENTED. THE SOVIETS HAVE TABLED NEW DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS AT THE LAST FOUR UNGA'S ALL WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT ADVANCE WARNING, LET ALONE DISCUSSION. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO DISCOURAGE SUCH TACTICS AS UNHELPFUL AND UNWORTHY OF A STATE WITH MAJOR RESPONSIBILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

9. WE HAVE ALREADY APPLIED THIS APPROACH WITH MODEST SUCCESS. CLOSE COORDINATION ON LAW OF THE SEA IS AN EXAMPLE: FREQUENT EXCHANGES HAVE RESOLVED A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN TROUBLESOME. ANOTHER ISSUE WHERE ACTIVE LOBBYING IN MOSCOW PRODUCED AT LEAST A SHORT-TERM DECISION FAVORABLE TO OUR INTERESTS WAS SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN EARLY DISCUSSIONS OF A SYSTEM OF WORLD GRAIN RESERVES (MOSCOW 1741). THE PAST YEAR HAS SEEN THE MOST FREQUENT AND HIGHEST-LEVEL U.S.- SOVIET EXCHANGES ON MULTILATERAL MATTERS EVER. HIGHLIGHTS WERE AMBASSADOR CLYDE

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FERGUSON'S VISIT IN MARCH 1975 (75 MOSCOW 3549, 75 MOSCOW A-150), ASSISTANT SECRETARY BUFFUM'S VISIT IN JUNE--FIRST EVER BY THE HEAD OF IO (75 MOSCOW 8369, 75 MOSCOW A-294)-- AND THE VISIT IN JUNE BY AMBASSADOR MOORE AND HIS COLLEAGUES OF THE LOS DELEGATION. BESIDE THESE MAJOR VISITS, MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS HAVE BEEN THE SUBJECT OF CONVERSATIONS BY THE AMBASSADOR AND MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF AT ALL LEVELS OF THE SOVIET MFA. THE NET RESULTS ARE DIFFICULT TO QUANTIFY, BUT THE ATMOSPHERE HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY CORDIAL, POINTS OF MINOR DIFFERENCE HAVE BEEN RESOLVED AMICABLY, AND THE GROUND HAS BEEN LAID FOR FURTHER PROGRESS.

10. THUS, THERE IS EVERY REASON TO PRESS FORWARD: THE LIMITS ON OUR INFLUENCE WITH THE SOVIETS ARE MORE STRINGENT THAN WITH MANY OTHER COUNTRIES, BUT THE STAKES ARE HIGHER, AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT PERHAPS MORE CONSIDERABLE. THE DEPARTMENT'S PERCEPTION THAT THESE ISSUES

WILL BULK LARGER IN THE FUTURE IS UNABBIGUOUSLY VALID FOR US-SOVIET RELATIONS. BUT SO IS ANOTHER PERCEPTION: THAT SUSTAINED EFFORT MUST REPLACE OCCASIONAL OR ANNUAL CONSULTATIONS IF WE ARE TO GRASP THE AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITIES. THE SOVIETS WORK WITHIN A SLOW-MOVING APPARATUS, AND WE NEED TO GET OUR VIEWS HOME TO THEM AT ALL LEVELS WELL BEFORE THE MEETINGS WE HOPE TO SHAPE. THE ANNUAL EXCHANGE BEFORE THE UNGA IS USEFUL, BUT OUR VIEWS WILL HAVE MORE IMPACT IF PRESENTED IN TIME TO BE FACTORED INTO THE EARLIER STAGES OF SOVIET PREPARATIONS NOT ONLY IN TOPICS BEFORE THE UN BUT ACROSS THE RANGE OF MULTILATERAL ISSUES.

11. THE MAJOR LIMIT ON EMBASSY MOSCOW'S CAPACITY TO PARTICIPATE USEFULLY IN THIS SUSTAINED EFFORT IS MANPOWER. WE ARE STRETCHED VERY TIGHTLY ALREADY TO PROVIDE THE KIND OF TIMELY REPORTING AND ANALYSIS WHICH CAN BE USEFUL TO THE USG IN DEALING WITH THE USSR. THE EMBASSY HAS DESIGNATED ONE OFFICER IN THE POLITICAL SECTION, FSO DARRYL JOHNSON, TO HANDLE MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS AS ONE OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES. HOWEVER, JOHNSON ALSO COVERS SOVIET RELATIONS WITH ALL OF ASIA, FROM AFGHANISTAN TO NEW ZEALAND. WHILE THE PROPORTION OF HIS TIME WHICH IS DEVOTED TO MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS HAS RISEN SIGNIFICANTLY IN THE PAST YEAR, GIVEN HIS OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES IT WILL BE CONFIDENTIAL

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IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO DEVOTE MORE TIME TO THIS AREA THAN HE IS ALREADY DOING. IN VIEW OF THE INCREASED IMPORTANCE WHICH WE ATTACH TO THIS FUNCTION, WE HAVE RECOMMENDED THAT A FULL-TIME MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS OFFICER BE ASSIGNED TO US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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